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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to U.C.A.
§78-2A-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1995).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff/Appellant, Sandiii Ma*well I Maxwell"I \w identified the issues
presented to the court and although she has failed to cite to the pages in the trial court record
where these issues are raised, the Defendants/Appellees, Estate of John S Adams ("Adams
Estate"), and Taylor, Ennenga, Adams & Lowe ("TEA&L") shall respond to those issues. Since
this case resulted in the lower court granting summary judgment in favor of the Adams Estate
and TEA&L, the standard of review for the appellate court is to review the trial court's rulings
under a correction-of-error standard. Aragon v. Clover Club Foods Company, 857 P.2d 250,
}52 (Utah \\\\\ IW3), Rawlins v. Peterson, 813 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1991).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Maxwell was the only named plaintiff in the lower court proceeding to assert
claims against the Adams Estate and TEA&L. Those claims were based upon legal malpractice
wherein Maxwell alleged that these defendants breached their contract and were negligent in
representing her interests in an action filed against her and others on October 8, 1985 in the
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County designated as Civil No. C85-6773 ("Wade
case"). This case involved real estate identified as the Pepperwood Property and Maxwell
alleged that because of the breaches of contract and negligence of the Adams Estate and TEA&L,
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she lost one-half of the property. In this case, Maxwell sought monetary damages against these
defendants for the loss of this property. The Adams Estate and TEA&L filed a motion for
summary judgment based upon the grounds that she could not establish by any competent
evidence the damages she had claimed to have incurred or that she had in fact suffered any
damages. The lower court granted summary judgment in an order dated April 20, 1995. (Trial
court record pp. 863, 864, hereinafter citations to trial court record shall be with an R. and the
page number).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since Maxwell in her "Facts" failed to support her factual statements by citations
to the trial court record, the facts relevant to the issues presented on this appeal are provided
below.
Maxwell's claims against the Adams Estate and TEA&L are set forth in the
Amended Complaint under the eleventh and twelfth claims for relief and allege that these
defendants breached their contract and were negligent in representing her interests in an action
filed against her and others on October 8, 1985 in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake
County, designated as Civil No. C85-6773 ("Wade case"). This case involved real estate
identified as the Pepperwood Property and Maxwell alleged that because of the breaches of
contract and negligence of the Adams Estate and TEA&L, she lost one-half of the Pepperwood
Property. In her prayer for relief under the eleventh and twelfth claims, she seeks monetary
damages against the Adams Estate and TEA&L for the loss of the property. (R. 345,399405,415,416 Addendum 1). Since Maxwell's claims are for legal malpractice relating to the
alleged loss of the Pepperwood property, it is important to understand the history of the property
2

relating to ownership. On April 28, 1970, Advance Business Equipment entered into a uniform
real estate contract with

M

v

Fisher and Francis Fisher for the purchase of the Pepperwood

property. Then Advance Business Equipment on February 27, 1976 assigned this uniform real
estate contract to Sandra I

Maxwell.

(R

818-821 representing the deposition of Sandra

Maxwell taken on October 2 1 , 1994, pp. 29,30, hereinafter referred to as the "Maxwell
deposition", assignment of contract, defendant's Exhibit no. 1 to the Maxwell deposition,
deposition of Richard

urke taken on October 24 and 25, 1994, p. 60, hereinafter referred

to as the "Burke deposition", Addendum 2.) Maxwell made payments to the Fishers for a period
warranty deed, conveyed the Pepperwood
property to Sandra L. Maxwell. (R. 822,823 which represents the Maxwell deposition, p 37,
jifiil il'fltinlaiif "?i I'.xhibil mi- ", ol ilir Maxwell ilqiiwiHoii

Addendum .1 I Ai some time in 1987,

Richard C. Burke, who was Maxwell's brother, formed a corporation by the name of Trendland,
Inc. il!""1 Trendland") because iMaivvuil vtiuiicd in \n\\ Ihc prnptTiy unci a atiporati" niliiy lor fhe
purpose of future develqpment. Then Maxwell conveyed the Pepperwood property to Trendland,
Inc. by warranty deed on September 23, 148/

In return Ini lliih i nnu'vance, Miivwdl irceiuil

a majority of the stock in Trendland which she still owns. (R. 824-829 which represents the
Maxwell deposition pp. 46 and 47, the Burke deposition, pp. I I I . 112 and
Exhibit no. 3 to the Maxwell deposition which is the warranty deed.

I

and defendant's

Addendum I )

For

purposes of this appeal, John S Adams (Adams Estate) and the law firm,, of TE A&L began
representing Maxwell in the Pepperwood action on August 12, 1988 as alleged in the amended
complaint. (R 3 72 )
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Maxwell, in her brief under the Facts at page 5, paragraph 5, makes the following
representation to the court in referencing Maxwell's conveyance of the Pepperwood property to
Trendland in September of 1987, she claims that when the transfer was accomplished, "It was
made with Trendland*s full knowledge, with the understanding that Maxwell would continue to
defend her ownership to the property/' There is nothing in the trial court record supporting
these facts.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Even though Maxwell raises four issues for review in her argument which will be
addressed, it is the contention of the Adams Estate and TEA&L that with the conveyance of the
Pepperwood property to Trendland on September 23, 1987, Maxwell's claim for the loss of onehalf of the Pepperwood property is not available. She cannot claim the loss of real property she
does not own, and therefore she has not incurred any damages as a result of the alleged conduct
of these defendants.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
MAXWELL IS NOT ENTITLED TO ASSERT CLAIMS
AGAINST THE ADAMS ESTATE AND TEA&L TO RECOVER THE PEPPERWOOD PROPERTY OR MONETARY
DAMAGES UNDER THE WARRANTY DEED CONVEYING THE PROPERTY TO TRENDLAND, INC.
Maxwell contends under point I of her argument that she was obligated to file an
action against the Adams Estate, TEA&L and others to recover the property or monetary
damages because of the conveyance of the Pepperwood property to Trendland by warranty deed.
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She cites as authority for this action U.C. A. §57-1-12 (1953). This section provides in pertinent
part "...That the grantor, his heirs and personal representatives will forever warrant and defend
the title thereof in the grantee, his heirs and assigns against all lawful claims whatsoever."
Maxwell sets up her argument by referencing Patricia Wade's case ("Wade case") which was
filed against Richard C. Burke, Advance Business Equipment and Maxwell in 1984 [sic] wherein
she sought to have the Pepperwood property declared a part of the marital estate which related
to her divorce from Mr. Burke.

She then states that while this action was pending, the

Pepperwood property was conveyed to Trendland by warranty deed in September of 1987. She
represents that "the conveyance was made with the full knowledge of Trendland, with the
understanding that Maxwell would continue to defend title to the property in the ongoing lawsuit
in her name. The goal was to successfully defend title in Maxwell's name in order that the
property be rightfully held by Trendland." (Maxwell brief at p. 8).
Although there is nothing in the Record to support these factual statements, her
representation that she did not prevail in the Patricia Wade case is accurate. She claims that the
loss incurred in this case caused her to be in breach of the warranty deed to Trendland and then
states in her brief, "Maxwell brought the present action in order to recover damages she has
suffered in breaching her contract with Trendland." (Maxwell brief at p. 8).
It is important to note Maxwell makes it clear her present claims against the
Adams Estate and TEA&L are for the purpose of recovering damages she suffered and not any
loss incurred by Trendland. In this case, she is not defending the title of the Pepperwood
property on behalf of Trendland against any lawful claim which is required under §57-1-12.
Maxwell admits to conveying the Pepperwood property to Trendland and also admits she
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received as consideration for this conveyance 90 percent of Trendland' s outstanding stock. There
is no question that Trendland lost one-half of the Pepperwood property but not Maxwell.
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that "...even though a shareholder owns
all, or practically all, of the stock in a corporation, such a fact does not authorize him to sue as
an individual for a wrong done by a third party to the corporation." Norman v. Murray First
Thrift and Loan Company, 596 P.2d 1028, 1031, 1032 (Utah 1979). There is nothing in
§57-1-12 which allows Maxwell to pursue her claims and obtain the relief she is seeking in her
Amended Complaint.
POINT II
EVEN IF MAXWELL BREACHED HER CONTRACT WITH
TRENDLAND AND IS POTENTIALLY LIABLE FOR THE
MONETARY VALUE OF THE LOST PROPERTY, SHE IS
STILL PRECLUDED FROM PURSUING THE CLAIMS AS
ALLEGED IN HER AMENDED COMPLAINT.
Maxwell argues under Point II of her brief that she owes Trendland the value of
the property lost and this is what she is seeking in the present case. However, she totally ignores
the criteria necessary to prove her claims against the Adams Estate and TEA&L. The elements
of an attorney malpractice action requires that the plaintiff prove, "(1) an attorney/client
relationship; (2) a duty of the attorney to the client; (3) a breach of that duty; and (4) damages
suffered by the client proximately caused by the attorney's breach of duty. Harline v. Barker,
854 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah App. 1993). See also Williams v. Barber, 765 P.2d 887 (Utah 1988).
The plaintiff must establish some competent evidence to support each of these elements. In this
case, the missing element in the claims asserted by Maxwell against the Adams Estate and
TEA&L is that she cannot establish by any competent evidence the damages she claims to have
6

incurred. There is no evidence in the trial court record that Trendland has made a claim against
her for the value of the property lost and therefore she has not suffered any damages. However,
Maxwell argues she is entitled to recover for an anticipated future loss in that Trendland might
assert a claim some time in the future. As support for this contention, Maxwell cites the case
of Walton v. City ofBozeman, 588 P.2d 518 (Mont. 1978). In this case, the city of Bozeman,
because of its expanding city limits, closed a ditch which provided water to the property of the
plaintiff, Roy Walton. In closing the ditch, the city installed a new diversion ditch with a culvert
placed under a road which would bring the water to Mr. Walton's land. There was a diversion
box with a cement structure with an iron grating and the court found that the construction of the
diversion box at times interfered with the flow of Walton1 s water preventing it from reaching his
land. In addition, the city had installed a storm sewer under another street which discharged its
drainage waters through a culvert and it would eventually come upon Walton's land and, at
times, cause flooding and pollution from the water. Based upon the flooding and damage to his
land, Mr. Walton filed suit against the city. The court found that the city was responsible for
the flooding and awarded Mr. Walton monetary damages for his losses. In addition, the court
awarded Mr. Walton monetary damages for future losses until the flooding and pollution
problems were remedied by the city. In upholding this award for future damages, the Supreme
Court of Montana stated the following:
It was proper for the court to award a reasonable amount of
damages for the continuing interference with the flow of Walton's
irrigation water, and the continuing flooding and discharge of
polluted waters upon his land.
"Prospective damages" are those which are reasonably certain to
follow the state of facts on which plaintiff's suit is based; such
damages have not yet accrued at the time of trial, but in the nature
7

things must certainly or most probably result from the state of facts
found to be existing at the time of trial. (Citation omitted) Walton
at 522.
In this case, the court concluded that the facts supported an award of prospective
damages based upon the existing facts that the Walton property would continue to have flooding
and related problems until the city fixed the ditches which were the cause. Maxwell's claims are
distinguishable from those of Mr. Walton. He established actual losses and that these losses
would occur in the future as long as the flooding and related problems continued. Maxwell
cannot establish any loss at this time, and based upon the factual allegations contained in her
Amended Complaint against the Adams Estate and TEA&L and the existing facts, she will never
suffer a loss of the Pepperwood property. The loss incurred is Trendland* s, and it has not taken
any action against Maxwell under the warranty deed. Maxwell's claim for future damages are
purely speculative which are not allowed under Utah law. Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 953 (Utah
1983).
POINT III
UNDER THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE AMENDED
COMPLAINT, TRENDLAND, INC. IS NOT THE REAL
PARTY IN INTEREST AND THE SUBSTITUTION OF
TRENDLAND, INC. FOR MAXWELL IS NOT
APPROPRIATE
Maxwell's attempt to utilize Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to
substitute Trendland, Inc. in her place as plaintiff cannot be done in this case. Maxwell's claims
against the Adams Estate and TEA&L are based upon alleged attorney malpractice. If Trendland
was substituted for Maxwell to pursue the attorney malpractice claims, those claims would fail
because Trendland cannot establish the necessary elements as set forth in Harline v. Barker, 854
8

P.2d 595 (Utah App. 1993). There is no evidence in the record that John S. Adams or the law
firm of Taylor, Ennenga, Adams & Lowe ever had an attorney/client relationship with
Trendland, Inc., and therefore, a substitution under Rule 17(a) would result in a dismissal of the
pending legal malpractice claims.
POINT IV
DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING
MAXWELL CANNOT ESTABLISH BY COMPETENT
EVIDENCE THE DAMAGE ELEMENT OF HER LEGAL
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
Maxwell argues under Point IV of her brief that the Adams Estate and TEA&L
cannot raise the issue of her ability to prove damages as a bar to her legal malpractice claims
based upon a theory of estoppel. However, she fails to acknowledge that it was her own conduct
that resulted in her inability to prove damages in this case. She conveyed the Pepperwood
property to Trendland in exchange for 90 percent of its stock in September 1987, almost one
year before John S. Adams and TEA&L began representing her in the Wade case. She benefited
from this transaction and now is attempting to obtain monetary compensation for the loss of
property she does not own. In fact, she did not own the property at the time the court in the
Wade case awarded one-half of it to Patricia Wade. Trendland incurred the loss and if there is
a claim to be made on any theory of liability against the Adams estate and TEA&L, it's
Trendland's. Furthermore, Trendland may be barred from asserting any claims based upon the
applicable statutes of limitations. See Utah Code Ann. §78-12-6 (1953).
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Maxwell cannot establish the three elements of estoppel which are set forth in
Ceco v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969, 970 (Utah 1989) wherein the Utah
Supreme Court stated:
Estoppel is an equitable defense that requires proof of three
elements: (i) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one
party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (ii) reasonable action
or inaction by the other party taken or not taken on the basis of the
first party1 s statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (iii)
injury to the second party that would result form allowing the first
party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act, or
failure to act.
Thefirsttwo elements are not relevant because Maxwell created her own problem
in this case when she conveyed the Pepperwood property to Trendland. In any event, Maxwell
cannot prove the third element regarding injury. She argues that she would suffer the injury of
losing her cause of action for legal malpractice if the Adams estate and TEA&L are allowed to
contradict their prior actions by claiming she has no damages. However, the facts before this
court establish that she never had a legal malpractice claim against the Adams estate and TEA&L
because she lacked the element of damages. Therefore, her injury cannot be the loss of her
cause of action for legal malpractice, and she has suffered no other damage.

10

CONCLUSION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the Adams estate and TEA&L respectfully
urge the court to affirm the summary judgment granted by the lower court.
DATED THIS

day of November, 1995.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

CARMAN E. KIPP, ESC
WILLIAM W. BARRETT, ESQ.
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees
Estate of John S. Adams by and
through Kent M. Kasting, Personal
Representative, and Taylor,
Ennenga, Adams & Lowe
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SANDRA L. MAXWELL;
RICHARD C. BURKE; and
ADVANCE BUSINESS EQUIPMENT,
a Utah corporation,

AMENDED COMPLAINT
(JURY TRIAL DEMANDED)

Plaintiffs,
vs.
JOHN T. CAINE,
RANDALL W. RICHARDS,
RICHARDS, CAINE & RICHARDS, a
Utah professional partnership;
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN, a Utah
professional partnership; the
ESTATE OF JOHN S. ADAMS, by and
through KENT M. KASTING, Personal
Representative; and
TAYLOR, ENNENGA, ADAMS & LOWE,
a Utah professional corporation,

Civil No. 920901881 CN

Defendants.
Plaintiffs complain of defendants, and, demanding trial by
jury, seek relief as follows:

1988)

conclusively

established

that

motions

for

reconsideration were appropriate in the circumstances;
(e) Entered into a Stipulation agreeing to prejudicially
shorten the time for the August 15, 1988 hearing on
Wade's Motion for Entry of Judgment; and
(f) Failed to ensure that Maxwell's new counsel timely filed
a Notice of Appeal of the Court's September 7, 1988 Order
and Judgment.
259. As a direct and proximate result of Richards' and RC&A's
negligence, Maxwell incurred substantial damage, including, but not
limited to, her loss of one-half of the Pepperwood Property, having
a value of approximately $600,000.
260. Maxwell is entitled to recover from Richards and RC&A all
damages sustained by Maxwell as a direct and proximate result of
Richards' and RC&A's negligence, including, but not.limited to, the
damages set forth in paragraph 259 above.
XIV
ELEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(AGAINST ADAMS AND TEA&L)
(Breach of Contract/Pepperwood Action)
For the Eleventh Claim for Relief, Maxwell complains against
defendants Adams' Estate and TEA&L, and alleges as follows:

55

261. Maxwell realleges and incorporates herein by reference
paragraphs 1 through 260 set forth hereinabove.
262. Maxwell entered into a valid contract whereby Adams and
TEA&L agreed to provide legal services to Maxwell in exchange for
a fee.
263. Maxwell's contract with Adams and TEA&L, which included
an implied covenant of competence, diligence and due care, required
Adams and TEA&L:
(a)

To be adequately prepared, upon accepting representation
of Maxwell, to defend Maxwell against all motions brought
against her;

(b)

To zealously defend Maxwell's interests in all hearings
where relief was sought against Maxwell;

(c)

To timely file notices of appeal of all final orders
adversely affecting Maxwell's interests;-

(d)

To request the Court to reconsider its October 21, 1988
Order on the grounds that the previously decided opinion
of the Court of Appeals in Salt Lake City Corp. v. James
Constructors,

761

P.2d

42,

44-45

(Utah

App.

1988)

conclusively established that motions for reconsideration
were appropriate in the circumstances;
(e)

To file reply memoranda supporting motions brought by
Adams and TEA&L on Maxwell's behalf; and
56
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(f)

To give Maxwell proper legal advise regarding her failure
to appeal final orders.

264. In breach of their contract with Maxwell in the implied
covenant of competence, diligence and due care, Adams and TEA&L
inexcusably:
(a)

Failed to request a continuance of the August 15, 1988
hearing on Wade's Motion for Entry of Judgment;

(b)

Failed

to make

any argument whatsoever

on Maxwell's

behalf at the August 15, 1988 hearing on Wade's Motion
for Entry of Judgment;
(c)

Failed

to

file timely notices of

appeal of

Court's September 7, 1988 Order and Judgment;
Court's October 21, 1988 Order; and

(1) the
(2) the

(3) the Court's

February 17, 1989 Order;
(d)

Failed to request the Court to reconsider its October 21,
1988 Order on the grounds that the previously decided
opinion of the Court of Appeals in Salt Lake City Corp.
v. James Constructors. 761 P.2d 42, 44-45
1988)

conclusively

established

that

(Utah App.

motions

for

reconsideration were appropriate in the circumstances;
(e)

Failed

to file any reply memorandum with respect to

Maxwell's December 28, 1988 Motion for Relief from the
September 7, 1988 Order and Judgment; and
57
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(f)

Incorrectly advised Maxwell through Burke that Burke's
appeal of the Court's December 2, 1988 Order would
adequately protect Maxwell

from the effects of the

Court's September 7, 1988 and October 21, 1988 Orders.
265. As a direct consequence of Adams' and TEA&L's breaches of
contract, Maxwell lost one-half of the Pepperwood Property.
266. By reason of Adams' and TEA&L's breaches of contract,
Maxwell has suffered damages resulting from those defendants'
breach in an amount in excess of $600,000, plus prejudgment
interest as provided by law, the precise amount of which will be
established by proof at trial.
XV
TWELFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(AGAINST ADAMS AND TEA&L)
(Negligence/Pepperwood Action)
For the Twelfth Claim for Relief, Maxwell complains against
defendants Adams' Estate and TEA&L, and alleges as follows:
267. Maxwell realleges and incorporates herein by reference
paragraphs 1 through 266 set forth hereinabove.
268. As Maxwell's attorneys, Adams and TEA&L owed Maxwell a
duty to represent Maxwell's interest with competence, diligence and
due care and to possess the legal skills and knowledge common to
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members of their profession, which included among other things, the
duties
(a)

To be adequately prepared, upon accepting representation
of Maxwell, to defend Maxwell against all motions brought
against her;

(b)

To zealously defend Maxwell's interests in all hearings
where relief was sought against Maxwell;

(c)

To timely file notices of appeal of all final orders
adversely affecting Maxwell's interests;

(d)

To request the Court to reconsider its October 21, 1988
Order on the grounds that the previously decided opinion
of the Court of Appeals in Salt Lake City Corp. v. James
Constructors,

761

P.2d

42,

44-45

(Utah

App.

1988)

conclusively established that motions for reconsideration
were appropriate in the circumstances;
(e)

To file reply memoranda supporting motions brought by
Adams and TEA&L on Maxwell's behalf; and

(f)

To give Maxwell proper legal advise regarding her failure
to appeal final orders.

269. In breach of the duties set forth above, Adams and TEA&L,
among other things, negligently
(a)

Failed to request a continuance of the August 15, 1988
hearing on Wade's Motion for Entry of Judgment;
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(b)

Failed

to make any argument whatsoever

on Maxwell's

behalf at the August 15, 1988 hearing on Wade's Motion
for Entry of Judgment;
(c)

Failed

to

file timely notices of appeal of

(1) the

Court's September 7, 1988 Order and Judgment; (2) the
Court's October

21, 1988 Order; and

(3) the Court's

February 17, 1989 Order;
(d)

Failed to request the Court to reconsider its October 21,
1988 Order on the grounds that the previously decided
opinion of the Court of Appeals in Salt Lake City Corp.
v. James Constructors. 761 P.2d 42, 44-45
1988)

conclusively

established

that

(Utah App.

motions

for

reconsideration were appropriate in the circumstances;
(e)

Failed to file any reply memorandum with respect to
Maxwell's December 28, 1988 Motion for Relief from the
September 7, 1988 Order and Judgment; and

(f)

Incorrectly advised Maxwell through Burke that Burke's
appeal

of

adequately

the Court's
protect

December

Maxwell

from

2,
the

1988 Order would
effects

of

the

Court's September 7, 1988 and October 21, 1988 Orders.
270. As a direct and proximate result of Adams' and TEA&L's
negligence, Maxwell incurred substantial damage, including, but not
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limited to, her loss of one-half of the Pepperwood Property, having
a value of approximately $600,000.
271. Maxwell is entitled to recover from Adams and TEA&L all
damages sustained by Maxwell as a direct and proximate result of
Adams' and TEA&L's negligence, including, but not limited to, the
damages set forth in paragraph 270 above.
XVI
THIRTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(AGAINST CAINE, RC&R AND RC&A)
(Breach of Contract/Child Support Judgments)
For the Thirteenth Claim for Relief Burke complains against
defendants Caine, RC&R and RC&A, and alleges as follows:
272. Burke realleges and incorporates herein by reference
paragraphs 1 through 271 as set forth hereinabove.
273. Burke entered into a valid contract whereby Caine, RC&R
and RC&A agreed to provide legal services to Burke in exchange for
a fee.
274. Burke's

contract with

Caine, RC&R

and

RC&A, which

included an implied covenant of competence, diligence and due care,
required Caine, RC&R and RC&A, among other things,:
(a) To prepare the findings of fact and conclusions of law
supporting the Decree in accordance with the court's
January 5, 1984 Order in the Divorce Action, stating that
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3.

That Maxwell recover from those defendants her cost of

4.

That Maxwell have such other and further relief as the

suit.

Court deems appropriate.
WHEREFORE, under the Eleventh Claim for Relief, Maxwell prays
for judgment against Defendants Adams and TEA&L as follows:
1.

That those defendants be adjudicated as having breached

their contract with Maxwell and are, therefore, liable to Maxwell.
2.
judgment

That

Maxwell

have and recover

from those

defendants

for all damages sustained by Maxwell at least in the

amount of $600,000, plus prejudgment interest.
3.

For an award of incidental and consequential damages

suffered by Maxwell, including an award of Maxwell's reasonable
attorneys' fees incurred in this matter.
4.

That Maxwell recover from those defendants her cost of

5.

That Maxwell have such other and further relief as the

suit.

Court deems appropriate.
WHEREFORE, under the Twelfth Claim for Relief, Maxwell prays
for judgment against Defendants Adams and TEA&L as follows:
1.

That defendants Adams and TEA&L be adjudicated as having

negligently represented Maxwell.
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2.
judgment

That Maxwell

have and recover

from those

defendants

for all damages sustained by Maxwell at least in the

amount of $600,000, plus prejudgment interest.
3.

That Maxwell recover from those defendants her cost of

4.

That Maxwell have such other and further relief as the

suit.

Court deems appropriate.
WHEREFORE, under the Thirteenth Claim for Relief, Burke prays
for judgment against Defendants Caine, RC&R and RC&A as follows:
1.

That those defendants be adjudicated as having breached

their contract with Burke and are, therefore, liable to Burke.
2.

That

Burke

have

and

recover

from

those

defendants

judgment for all damages sustained by Burke at least in the amount
of $48,000, plus prejudgment interest.
3.
suffered

For an award of incidental and consequential damages
by

Burke,

including

an

award

of

Burke's

reasonable

attorneys' fees incurred in this matter.
4.

That Burke recover from those defendants his costs of

5.

That Burke have such other and further relief as the

suit.

Court deems appropriate.
WHEREFORE, under the Fourteenth Claim for Relief, Burke prays
for judgment against Defendants Caine, RC&R and RC&A as follows:
72

0 (, i; 4 i P

ADDENDUM 2

Oil /Z, 111?
29
Q

What was the next piece of property

1
2
3

okay, we've now talked about your home that you
still live in.

What was the next piece of real

property that you've either purchased or received?
A

That would be the large piece,

g

Pepperwood property.

-

MR. KAY:

Would you mark that.

(Whereupon, Defendant's Exhibit

fl

No. 1 was marked for

9

identification.)

10
Q

(BY MR. KAY)

I'm going to hand you,

11
12

Mrs. Maxwell, Defendant's Exhibit 1 which is

13

entitled an Assignment of Contract that was given

14

to me by your attorney this morning.

15

understanding, an Assignment of Contract relating

16

to what you've described as the Pepperwood

17

property?

Is that your

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

What was the date that you received an

20

interest in the Pepperwood property?

21
22

MR. HAGEN:

"says on there if you want.

23
24

25

You can look at what it

Q

THE WITNESS:

1970.

(BY MR. KAY)

Well, I believe does it

say that you received it February --

Transcribe America
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A

I'm sorry.

Q

I think that's the original Uniform

Real Estate Contract.

r-

I'm looking down here.

Is it your understanding it

was approximately February 27th, 1976?-

4

A

Yeah.
MR. KIPP:

€

MR. KAY:

1

What are we looking at now?
We're looking at the

Pepperwood Assignment of Contract that's been
f

marked as Exhibit 1 in the documents they gave us

10

today.

11

hand .

It's that document that you have in your

MR. KIPP:

12
13

Q

Thank you.

(BY MR. KAY)

How was it that you

14

received this Pepperwood property that's been

15

described in Exhibit 1 in February of 1976?

16

A

I'm sorry, what do you mean?

17

Q

Well, prior to February 27th, 1976, I

18

understand that you didn't have the Pepperwood

19

property; is that correct?

20

A

Yes, uh-huh.

21

Q

Who owned the Pepperwood property

22

before February 27, 1976?

23

A

Advance Business Equipment.

24

Q

And Advance Business Equipment is a

25

company that your brother, Richard Burke owns; is
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the

' 70's, or not?
A

I believe it was in the '80's.

Q

So you bought the Pepperwood property

from the Fishers and paid payments for a few years;
is that correct?
A

That's correct.

Q

And then in 1976, February 27, 1976,

you assigned the contract with the Fishers to
Sandra Maxwell; is that correct?
A

That's correct.

Q

Now, why did you assign the contract

between Advance Business Equipment and the Fishers
to Sandra Maxwell?
A

Well, for two reasons, basically.

The

company was in a little bit of a financial problem
at that period of time and I didn't feel that the
company would have the money to make the next
payment to the Fishers, and we didn't want to lose
the property entirely, so -Q

Did you have a concern that if the

company still had the property, that creditors
could reach it?
A

.Well, it wouldn't be creditors.

It

would just be that if we couldn't make the
payments, that Bud Fisher would probably take the

Transcribe America
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A

To Mrs. Fisher?

Q

Yes .

A

Yes .

Q

How many years did you make payments?

A

Oh, what, 10 years possibly.

I can't

remember exactly.
Q

After you made payments and paid off

the contract, did you receive a Warranty Deed from
the Fishers?
A

Yes .

Q

And you didn't produce any Warranty

Deed today; is that correct?
A

Apparently not.
(Whereupon, Defendant's Exhibit
No. 2 was marked for
identification.)

Q

(BY MR. KAY)

I'm going to hand you

what's been marked as Exhibit 2 to your deposition,
Mrs. Maxwell, and this is entitled Warranty Deed
from Frances Fisher to Sandra Maxwell dated May 20,
1983.

Is Exhibit 2 the Warranty Deed that you

received from Frances Fisher after you had paid the
contract on Pepperwood?
A

It looks to be that.

Q

Does this refresh your memory that you

ft ii n \ 4> '>

Mail tax notice to

Address

4404466

WARRANTY DEED

F r a n c e s F i s h e r . V/ife of H. R. F i s h e r
S a l t
of
S a l e Lake C i t y
Counry of
COSVCY and WARRANT to

(deceased)

rimor
State of Utah, herebv

Ljkc

\\\

Sandra L. Maxwell, a woman
of Ogden, County o f Weber, S t a t e o f Utah
Ten d o l l a r s and o t h e r good and v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n

grantee
for the sum of
DOLLARS

the following described tract of land in
State of Utah:

Counrv,

The South 396 f e e t o f the N o r t h e a s t q u a r t e r of the Northwest q u a r t e r o f the
Northeast q u a r t e r o f S e c t i o n 2 2 ; the South 396 f e e t of the East o n e - h a l f o f
the Northwest q u a r t e r o f the N o r t h w e s t q u a r t e r o f the N o r t h e a s t q u a r t e r o f
S e c t i o n 2 2 ; the North 264 f e e t o f the S o u t h e a s t q u a r t e r o f the N o r t h w e s t .
q u a r t e r of the N o r t h e a s t q u a r t e r of S e c t i o n 22; Znd the .North 26£ f e e t o f
chf East o n « - h a l f o f the Southwt*»t q u a r t e r of ch.» Northwest q u a r t e r o f the
N o r t h e a s t q u a r t e r o f S e c t i o n 2 2 , Township 3 South, Range I E a s t , SLB£M
SUBJECT t o e a s e r e e n t s , r e s t r i c t i o n . * and r i g h t s of way appearing o f r e c o r d ,
r n t o r c c a o i e i n law or e q u i t y .

WITNESS, the hand of said grantor, this
20th
May
, A.D. 1983

or

dav of

Sicncd in the Presence of

STATE OF UTAH,
Countv of J..J.{."f
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-> 0 * s J
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YY\CL
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No. 3 was marked for
identification.)
Q

(BY MR. KAY)

I'm going to hand you

what's been marked as Exhibit 3 to your
deposition.

Can you tell me what that is,

Mrs. Maxwell?

Do you know what Exhibit 3 is?

A

A Warranty Deed.

Q

At some point after May of 1983, did

you transfer your interest in the Pepperwood
property to a corporation called Trendland, Inc.?
A

Yes .

Q

And was that approximately September

23rd, 1987?
A

Yes, uh-huh.

Q

Did you sign this deed and have it

notarized on September 23rd, 1987?
A

Yes .

Q

That is your signature under the date?

A

Yes .

Q

Why did you transfer this property

through Exhibit 3, the Warranty Deed to Trendland,
Inc. in September of 1987?
A

Well, we had hopes of developing the

piece of property.
Q

Who is we?

ft (HI v, 9 !
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A

u

Myself and the -- myself principally.
MR. KIPP:

I'm not able to hear you.

THE WITNESS:
MR. HAGEN:
Q
again.

(BY MR. KAY)

I'm sorry.
Do you want to repeat.
Let me ask the question

Why did you transfer the Pepperwood

property to Trendland, Inc. in September of 1987?
A

We had hopes of developing the piece of

property.
Q

And when you say we, are you only

referring to yourself or someone else?
A

Well, primarily, at first myself.

Q

What was Trendland, Inc.?

A

It was a corporation.

Q

Is this a corporation that you were an

of ficer in?
A

No.

I had primarily most of the -- the t

majority -- I shouldn't say most, I should say the
majority of the stock in Trendland.
Q

Were you an officer or director in

Trendland at the time that you conveyed the
Pepperwood property to Trendland in September of
1987?
A

I don't believe so, no.

Q

How much money were you paid by

'v (i i\ \ 0 \

Gc/. w,

'ft
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A

Yes, he did.

Q

Okay, when?

A

Well, I don't know the exact time that

^e first started to represent me.

I don't know.

I

thought it was in 1978 sometime.
Q

Do you have any explanation why your

wife's attorney sent you a Motion for Sanctions on
December 14, 1978 instead of sending it to John
Caine?
A

I don't know the answer to that.

Q

We were talking about the Pepperwood

case before lunch, Mr. Burke, and I believe you
said that Trendland paid the property taxes on
Pepperwood; is that correct?
A

Trendland paid the rollback taxes on

the Pepperwood property.
Q

Of approximately $30,000?

A

Approximately.

I don't know the exact

amount.
Q
about?

How did the Trendland Corporation come
Whose idea was it?

A

Well, it was Sandra Maxwell's.

She

wanted the property into a corporation which would
take some of the pressure off her, and she also
wanted to have it in a vehicle for future

TranScribe America
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development.

So it was because of that that I

initially started Trendland and we had the property
put into Trendland.
Q

Can you tell me how putting the

Pepperwood property in a corporation was going to
take pressure off of Sandra Maxwell?
A

Well, she wouldn't directly own the

property any more, not directly.

She would

indirectly because she was such a large
stockholder, she could receive stock from the
corporation from putting the property into it.
Q

What did Sandra Maxwell get for putting

the Pepperwood property into the Trendland
Corporation?
A

Shares of stock.

Q

And what were the shares of stock of

Trendland worth when she put the property into it?
A

Well, the shares of stock would have to

be set up as to the value or were set up as to the
value of the property at the time that she put the
property in, and I don't recall what that value was
at that time at all.
Q

Okay, the incorporators of Trendland,

Inc. were Richard Burke, Maury Burke and Pamela
Reichert; is that correct?

Transcribe America
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a director?
,*

MR. HAGEN:
foundation.

I'm g o i n g to o b j e c t ,

I don't think he can t e s t i f y as to

what h i s s i s t e r k n o w s .
THE W I T N E S S :

I really can't.

I don't

(BY M R . K A Y )

W a s y o u r s i s t e r the only

know t h a t .
,1
g
ae

•

Q

s h a r e h o l d e r of T r e n d l a n d ,
A

No.

Inc.?

T h e o t h e r p e o p l e that came in as

|0

o f f i c e r s and d i r e c t o r s w e r e g i v e n s h a r e s of stock

jl

in the c o r p o r a t i o n .

jj|
j3

Q

H o w m a n y s h a r e s of stock w a s y o u r

sister given when Trendland,

Inc. was formed?

14

A

I b e l i e v e it w a s 5 0 , 0 0 0 .

j5

Q

How many shares were you given?

16

A

I wasn't given any.

17

Q

H o w m a n y s h a r e s w e r e a n y of the o t h e r

18
19
20
a?
21

o f f i c e r s or d i r e c t o r s
A

given?

At the time the c o r p o r a t i o n w a s formed,

there was none given o u t .
Q

At a n y time a f t e r the c o r p o r a t i o n w a s

r

22

f o r m e d , w e r e a n y of the o f f i c e r s or d i r e c t o r s

23

s h a r e s in T r e n d l a n d ,

24
25

A
Q

given

Inc.?

Y e s , they w e r e .
Were you g i v e n any?

Transcribe America
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WARRANTY DEED
grantor

SANDRA L. MAXWELL, A WOMAN
of Ogden, County of
CONVEY

and WARRANT

County of

Weber

State of Utah, hereby

to

TRENDLAND INC.
grantee
of

SALT LAKE CITY

for the turn of

County

SALT LAKE

State of Utah

Ten dollars and other good and valuable consideration

DOLLARS

the following described tract of land in

County,

State of Utah, to-wit:
The South 396 feet of the Northeast quarter of the Northwest quarter of the
Northeast quarter of Section 22; the South 396 feet of the East one-half of
the Northwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of
Section 22; the North 264 feet of the Southeast quarter of the Northwest
quarter of the Northeast quarter of Section 22; and North 264 feet of the
East one-half of the Southwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of the
Northeast quarter of Section 22, Township 3 South, Range 1 East. SLB&M

i

SUBJECT TO easements, restrictions and rights of way appearing of record, or
enforceable In law or equity.
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the signer of the within instrument who duly acknowledged
to me that he executed the same.
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